The case of the murder of Henry Nowak in December last year is not a financial crime. So why am I writing about it? Simple: it is a case study in suspicion, how it is formed, what is done with it and how presumptions over-ride evidence.

Vickrum Digwa stabbed Nowak five times using a Kirpan, a "ceremonial" knife that all Sikhs are required to carry after formal admission to the faith. However, very few Sikhs carry the actual knife, they wear badges, embroider their clothes and they do not wander the streets with a savagely sharp 21 inch blade which, it is incredible to realise, does not, apparently, fall under the absolute ban on large knives and swords in UK law. Nowak's injuries were very severe and one has to question whether he would have survived long enough for an ambulance to reach him in any case, never mind getting him to hospital and into surgery.

But he might have. And at a time when seconds were critical, officers were misled by Digwa's statement and assumed that Nowak had been the aggressor.

When police arrived, Digwa told them he was acting in self-defence. Closed circuit TV released later proved that to be a lie and he has been convicted of murder and sentenced to jail for a minimum of 21 years.

The reason this story is important in the context of suspicion is that there has been considerable complaint about the police conduct when they arrived. To be clear: the police were gentle and kind and genuinely distraught when Nowak died while handcuffed as a result of Digwa's lie.

They are victims, too. They will suffer guilt and will be subject to disciplinary hearings.

Yet, it is the system, not the officers which failed Henry Nowak and following the release of the bodycam footage, after Digwa was sentenced, makes that abundantly clear. It also makes it abundantly clear that a world that prioritises compliance over assessment of relevant circumstances creates an unacceptable risk of failure.

DIgwa's lie played directly into the training that officers go get and, worse, to the instructions they are given without adequate training. Digwa had no fear that he would not be believed when he stayed on the scene, spoke to police and told them, in terms "the white guy started it and I just defended myself."

The course of events was determined: Nowak was white, Digwa wasn't. Digwa was left unrestrained, Nowak was handcuffed. Digwa stood around, Nowak couldn't sit up. Digwa was talking, Nowak was saying "I can't breathe."

OK, that was probably the worst thing anyone being restrained could possibly say since the George Floyd murder by police in the USA. Officers probably hear it as much as they hear "ow" or "my arm hurts."

But in Nowak's case, it seems to have been true. He said it twice and immediately collapsed with an officer reporting seconds later that his pupils were unresponsive.

Again, watching the video it is clear: the officers didn't shout, they were not in any way aggressive and they did not manhandle Nowak although there was some force in fitting his right wrist into the handcuffs but all the time the officer was persuading, not ordering, Nowak to assist.

Nowak had already told the officers that he had been stabbed. Two officers looked but failed to find wounds despite it later being established that there were five wounds inflicted with a large knife.

So, the officers had very little to go on except Digwa's statement and the fact that they didnt' find any evidence of stabbing. Taking those facts in isolation make the responses of the officers far from unreasonable.

But it is clear that something interfered with the officers' approach. Given the facts they had, they were suspicious of the wrong person.

Why did they trust Digwa and not trust Nowak?

Why was that trust so convincing that Digwa was not restrained?

Why was Digwa so sure that his lies would carry the day that he stood around not fearing his own arrest?

The answers lie in the fundamentals of suspicion.

There is knowledge, belief and suspicion.

Knowledge is supported by evidence, belief is supported by trust or faith and suspicion is supported by a feeling, albeit a feeling that arises from how a person views facts.

There are facts which we like to pretend are always true but actually they are a lot more flexible than many people assert: these are what we tend to regard as evidence.

There is information: this is unproven but still, broadly, reliable - or so those relying on it think.

There is intelligence: this might be gossip (don't laugh - that's what a huge proportion of "open source intelligence" amounts to) or it might be something that looks more or less likely but doesn't quite pass the sniff test unless corroborated. It is into this group that the prudent would always put the results of a computer-generated report.

So the officers needed to decide what, if anything, amounted to a fact and, in the absence of finding a wound, the only fact they decided was that Digwa was truthful and Nowak wasn't.

Why? We can only surmise, extrapolating from the direction policing in the UK has taken over a period of several years. It is rapidly becoming apparent that police officers are told that non-white persons are to be given preferential treatment. That conclusion is supported by Dagwa's apparent lack of concern that his story would not be believed and that he would not be detained. If there is such a predisposition, it is a very dangerous thing but in the light of current policing, where some people and groups appear to invite trouble knowing that someone else will be blamed for causing it. This is no different to most kindergarten playground but the consequences are far more serious.

This reflects a superficial approach to suspicion and it's an approach that law enforcement, the judiciary and even financial sector regulators fail to address.

Suspicion is at the heart of almost all criminal cases: "you are arrested on suspicion of....."

The lack of specialist training on the subject of suspicion is at the heart of the Nowak tragedy. Worse, the predisposition referred to above reduced the chances of Nowak being believed.

There is only one detailed study of suspicion in financial crime and, therefore, by extension, general policing.

First published in 2015 and greatly updated for the 2025 Second Edition, Understanding Suspicion in Financial Crime is available in hardback and paperback and in instant download

Note: I watched the video then lost it. If someone else finds it, please let me know.

Nigel Morris-Cotterill is a pioneer in the field of financial crime risk. His blog at www.countermoneylaundering.com is often controversial. He is the author of several books including the seminal "How not to be a money launderer" and has written and presented many papers at high-level conferences all over the world. He also presents seminars on a wide range of financial crime risk areas.